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Abstract—Static analysis is one of the most widely adopted
techniques to find software bugs before code is put in production.
Designing and implementing effective and efficient static analyses
is difficult and requires high expertise, which results in only a
few experts able to write such analyses. This paper explores the
opportunities and challenges of an alternative way of creating
static bug detectors: neural bug finding. The basic idea is to
formulate bug detection as a classification problem, and to
address this problem with neural networks trained on examples
of buggy and non-buggy code. We systematically study the
effectiveness of this approach based on code examples labeled
by a state-of-the-art, static bug detector. Our results show that
neural bug finding is surprisingly effective for some bug patterns,
sometimes reaching a precision and recall of over 80%, but also
that it struggles to understand some program properties obvious
to a traditional analysis. A qualitative analysis of the results
provides insights into why neural bug finders sometimes work
and sometimes do not work. We also identify pitfalls in selecting
the code examples used to train and validate neural bug finders,
and propose an algorithm for selecting effective training data.
I. INTRODUCTION
A popular way of finding software bugs early during the
development process is static analysis tools that search a code
base for instances of common bug patterns. These tools, which
we here call bug detectors, often consist of a scalable static
analysis framework and an extensible set of checkers that each
search for instances of a specific bug pattern. Examples of
bug detectors include the pioneering FindBugs tool [1], its
successor SpotBugs1, Google’s Error Prone tool [2], and the
Infer tool by Facebook [3].
Despite the overall success of static bug detection tools,
there still remains a lot of potential for improvement. A recent
study that applied state-of-the-art bug detectors to a set of al-
most 600 real-world bugs shows that over 95% of the bugs are
currently missed [4]. The main reason is that various different
bug patterns exist, each of which needs a different bug detector.
These bug detectors must be manually created, typically by
program analysis experts, and they require significant fine-
tuning to find actual bugs without overwhelming developers
with spurious warnings. Bug detectors often require hundreds
of lines of code each, even for bug patterns that seem trivial
to find at first sight and when being built on top of a static
analysis framework.
1https://spotbugs.github.io/
This paper studies a novel way of creating bug detectors:
neural bug finding. Motivated by the huge success of neural
networks for various software engineering tasks [5], we ask
a simple question: Can we automatically learn bug detec-
tors from data, instead of implementing program analyses
manually? Giving a positive answer to this question has the
potential of complementing existing bug detectors with addi-
tional checkers that address previously ignored bug patterns.
Moreover, it may enable non-experts in program analysis, e.g.,
ordinary software developers, to contribute to the creation of
bug detectors.
Given the importance of bug detection and the power of
neural networks, the intersection of these two areas so far has
received surprisingly little attention. Existing work focuses
on learning-based defect prediction [6], which ranks entire
files by their probability to contain any kind of bug, whereas
we here aim at pinpointing code that suffers from a specific
kind of bug. Other work addresses the problems of predicting
code changes [7], predicting identifier names [8]–[10], and
predicting how to complete partial code [11]–[13], which are
complementary to detecting bugs. The perhaps closest existing
work is DeepBugs [14], which trains a neural network to find
name-related bugs, and learning-based techniques for identify-
ing security vulnerabilities [15]–[17]. While these approaches
show that neural bug finding is possible for a specific class
of bugs, we here study the potential of neural bug finding in
much more detail and for a broader range of code issues.
Automatically learning bug detectors requires addressing
two problems: (1) Obtaining sufficient training data, e.g., con-
sisting of buggy and non-buggy code examples. (2) Training a
model that identifies bugs, e.g., by distinguishing buggy code
from non-buggy code. The first problem could be addressed
by automatically seeding bugs into code, by extracting buggy
code examples from version histories, or by manually labeling
code examples as instances of specific bug patterns. In this
work, we sidestep the first problem and study whether given
sufficient training data, the second problem is tractable. Our
work therefore does not yield a ready-to-deploy bug detection
tool, but rather novel insights into what kinds of bugs neural
bug finding can and cannot find. We believe that thoroughly
studying this question in isolation is an important step forward
toward the ultimate goal of neural bug finding.
To study the potential of learned bug detectors while
sidestepping the problem of obtaining labeled training data,
we use an existing, traditionally developed bug detector as a
generator of training data. To this end, we run the existing bug
detector on a corpus of code to obtain warnings about specific
kinds of bugs. Using these warnings and their absence as a
ground truth, we then train a neural model to distinguish code
with a particular kind of warning from code without such a
warning. For example, we train a model that predicts whether a
piece of code uses reference equality instead of value equality
for comparing objects in Java. This setup allows us to assess
to what extent neural bug finding can imitate existing bug
detectors.
One drawback of using an existing bug detector as the
data generator is that some warnings may be spurious and
that some bugs may be missed. To mitigate this problem, we
focus on bugs flagged by bug detectors that are enabled in
production in a major company and that empirically show
false positive rates below 10% [18]. Another drawback is that
the learned bug detectors are unlikely to outperform the static
analyzers they learn from. However, the purpose of this work
is to study whether training a model for neural bug finding is
feasible, whereas we leave the problem of obtaining training
data beyond existing static analyzers as future work.
The main findings of our study include the following:
• Learned bug detectors identify instances of a surpris-
ingly large number of bug patterns with precision and
recall over 80%. At the same time, the learned models
sometimes fail to understand program properties that a
traditional analysis easily finds.
• Neural bug finding works because the models learn to
identify common syntactic patterns correlated with bugs,
particular API misuses, or common instances of a more
general bug pattern.
• The composition of the training data a neural bug finding
model is learned from has a huge impact on the model’s
effectiveness. We study several strategies for composing
training data and present a novel algorithm for selecting
effective training examples.
• More training data yields more effective models, but
surprisingly small data sets, e.g., of only 77 examples,
can still yield effective neural bug detectors.
• Following a naive approach for validating a learned bug
detector may lead to very misleading results.
In summary, this paper contributes the first comprehensive
study of neural bug finding. The study reveals novel insights
into the opportunities and challenges associated with this novel
way of creating bug detectors. We believe that our work
is a step forward toward complementing traditional ways of
creating bug detectors. In particular, the study provides a basis
for future work on generating training data for neural bug
finding, for developing machine learning models that reason
about rich representations of code, and for building neural bug
finding tools. To fuel these and other lines of future work, we
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Fig. 1. Overview of neural bug finding.
make our tool and data set publicly available.2
II. METHODOLOGY
Our approach applies machine learning (ML), specifically
deep learning, to source code and learns a model that predicts
whether a given piece of code suffers from a specific bug
or not. Figure 1 gives an overview of the neural bug finding
approach. As training and validation data, we gather hundreds
of thousands of code examples, some of which are known to
contain specific kinds of bugs, from a corpus of real-world
software projects (Section II-A). To feed these code examples
into a neural model, we abstract and vectorize the source code
of individual methods (Section II-B). A particularly interesting
challenge is how to select examples of buggy and non-buggy
code for training the bug detection model, which we address
in Section II-C. Finally, Section II-D describes how we train
recurrent neural network (RNN) models that predict different
kinds of bugs.
A. Gathering Data
To study the capability of neural bug finding, we need some
kind of oracle that provides examples of buggy and non-buggy
code to train ML models. One could potentially collect such
data from existing bug benchmarks [19]–[21]. Unfortunately,
such bug benchmarks provide at most a few hundreds of buggy
code examples, which is a relatively small number for training
neural networks. Other directions include mining existing code
repositories for pull requests and commits that fix bugs or
generating training data by injecting bugs, e.g., via mutations.
In this work, we obtain examples of buggy and non-buggy
code by running a state-of-the-art static analyzer as an oracle
on a large corpus of code, and by collecting warnings produced
by the static analyzer. We use Error Prone [2] as the oracle, a
state-of-the-art static bug finding tool for Java, which is devel-
oped and used by Google, and made available as open-source.
We run Error Prone on the Qualitas Corpus [22], a curated set
of 112 open-source Java projects and collect all warnings and
errors reported by Error Prone along with their corresponding
kinds and code locations. To simplify terminology, we call
all problems reported by Error Prone a “bug”, irrespective
of whether a problem affects the correctness, maintainability,
performance, etc. of code.
2URL inserted into final version.
Table I shows the bug kinds we consider in this work.
Error Prone warnings flag class-level problems, e.g., mutable
enums; method-level problems, e.g., missing annotations, such
as the @Override annotation (Id 1 in Table I); and statement-
level and expression-level issues, such as expressions with
confusing operator precedence (Id 9 in Table I). Since most
of the warnings are at the method level or at the expression
level, our study focuses on learning to predict those bugs,
ignoring class-level bugs. After removing class-level bugs,
Table I includes the 20 most common kinds of bugs reported
by Error Prone on the Qualitas corpus.
To illustrate that finding these bugs with traditional means
is non-trivial, the last column of Table I shows how many
non-comment, non-empty lines of Java code each bug detector
has. On average, each bug detector has 170 lines of code, in
addition to th 156k lines of general infrastructure and test code
in the Error Prone project. These numbers show that manually
creating bug detectors is a non-trivial effort that would be
worthwhile to complement with learned bug detectors.
B. Representing Methods as Vectors
1) Code as Token Sequences: The next step is modeling
source code in a manner that allows us to apply machine
learning to it to learn patterns of buggy and non-buggy
code. Among the different approaches, we here choose to
represent code as a sequence of tokens. This representation
is similar to natural languages [23], [24] and has seen various
applications in programming and software engineering tasks,
such as bug detection [25], program repair [26], [27], and code
completion [12].
Let M be the set of all non-abstract Java methods in our
corpus of code. For each method m ∈ M , we extract the
sequence of tokens sm from the method body, starting at the
method definition and up to length n. Let S be the set of
all sequences extracted from all methods M . Extracted tokens
include keywords such as for, if, and void; separators such
as ;, (), and ,; identifiers such as variable, method, and class
names; and finally, literals such as 5 and "abc". Each token
ti = (lex, t, l), where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a tuple of the lexeme
itself, its type t, and the line number l at which t occurs in
the source file. We ignore comments. As a default, we choose
a sequence length of n = 50 in our experiments.
As an alternative to a token sequence-based code represen-
tation, we could model code, e.g., as abstract syntax trees
(ASTs), control-flow graphs (CFGs), or program-dependence
graphs (PDGs). Recent work has started to explore the po-
tential of graph-based code representations [28]–[32]. We
here deliberately focus on a simpler, sequence-based code
representation, so that our study provides a lower bound on
the potential effectiveness of neural bug finding, leaving the
use of richer code representations as future work.
2) Representing Tokens: To enable the ML model to learn
and generalize patterns from source code, we abstract the
extracted token sequences in such a way that discovered
patterns are reusable across different pieces of code. One
challenge is that source code has a huge vocabulary due to
identifiers and literals chosen by developers [33]. To mitigate
this problem, we extract a vocabulary V consisting of the most
frequent keywords, separators, identifiers, and literals from all
code in our corpus. In addition to the tokens in the corpus, we
include two special tokens: UNK, to represent any occurrence
of a token beyond the most frequent tokens, and PAD to pad
short sequences. In our experiments, we set |V | = 1000 which
covers 82% of all keywords, separators, identifiers, and literals
in our corpus.
We convert the sequences of tokens of a given code example
to a real-valued vector by representing each token t through its
one-hot encoding. The one-hot encoding functionH(t) returns
a vector of length |V |, where all elements are zero except
one that represents the specific token t. To allow the learned
models to generalize across similar tokens, we furthermore
learn an embedding function E that maps H(t) to Re, where
e is the embedding size. Based on these two functions, we
represent a sequence of tokens s ∈ S through a real-valued
vector vs as follows:
Definition 1 (Source Code Vector):
For a sequence of tokens s ∈ S of length n, where
s = t1, t2, . . . , tn is extracted from a source code method
m ∈ M , the vector representation of s is vs =
[E(H(t1)), E(H(t2)), . . . , E(H(tn))].
C. Buggy and Non-Buggy Examples
The training and validation data consists of two kinds of
code examples: buggy and non-buggy examples. We focus
on methods as code examples, i.e., our neural bug detectors
predict whether a method contains a particular kind of bug. Let
K be the set of all bug kinds that the oracle can detect and W
be the set of all warnings reported by it on the Qualitas corpus.
Each warning w ∈ W is represented as w = (k, l,m) where
k ∈ K is the bug kind flagged at line number l in method m.
For each kind of bug k ∈ K , we consider two subsets of M :
• The set Mkbug of methods flagged by the oracle to suffer
from bug kind k.
• The set MknBug of methods for which the oracle does not
report any bug of kind k.
Based on these two sets, we select a subset of the methods as
examples to train and validate our models, as described in the
following. After selecting the methods, we produce two sets
of sequences, Skbug and SknBug , as described in Section II-B.
1) Selecting Non-Buggy Examples: One strategy for se-
lecting non-buggy examples is to randomly sample from all
methods that are not flagged as buggy for a bug of kind k.
However, we found this naive approach to bias the learned
model towards the presence or absence of specific tokens
related to k, but not necessarily sufficient to precisely detect k.
For example, when training a model to predict a problem with
binary expressions (Id 9 in Table I), using the naive approach
to select non-buggy examples would result in a model that
learns to distinguish source code sequences that contain binary
expressions from sequences that do not. In other words, it
would simply flag any binary expression as potentially buggy.
TABLE I
TOP 20 WARNINGS REPORTED BY ERROR PRONE ON THE QUALITAS CORPUS.
Id Warning Count Description LoC
1 MissingOverride 268,304 Expected @Override because method overrides method in supertype; including interfaces 111
2 BoxedPrimitiveConstructor 3,769 valueOf or autoboxing provides better time and space performance 268
3 SynchronizeOnNonFinalField 2,282 Synchronizing on non-final fields is not safe if the field is updated 66
4 ReferenceEquality 1,680 Compare reference types using reference equality instead of value equality 282
5 DefaultCharset 1,550 Implicit use of the platform default charset, can result in unexpected behaviour 515
6 EqualsHashCode 590 Classes that override equals should also override hashCode 106
7 UnsynchronizedOverridesSynchronized 517 Thread-safe methods should not be overridden by methods that are not thread-safe 125
8 ClassNewInstance 486 Class.newInstance() bypasses exception checking 254
9 OperatorPrecedence 362 Ambiguous expressions due to unclear precedence 118
10 DoubleCheckedLocking 204 Double-checked locking on non-volatile fields is unsafe 305
11 NonOverridingEquals 165 A method that looks like Object.equals but does not actually override it 179
12 NarrowingCompoundAssignment 158 Compound assignments like x += y may hide dangerous casts 167
13 ShortCircuitBoolean 116 Prefer the short-circuiting boolean operators && and || to & and | 88
14 IntLongMath 111 Expression of type int may overflow before being assigned to a long 127
15 NonAtomicVolatileUpdate 80 Update of a volatile variable is non-atomic 142
16 WaitNotInLoop 77 Object.wait() and Condition.await() must be called in a loop to avoid spurious wakeups 76
17 ArrayToString 56 Calling toString on an array does not provide useful information (prints its identity) 256
18 MissingCasesInEnumSwitch 53 Switches on enum types should either handle all values, or have a default case 86
19 TypeParameterUnusedInFormals 46 A method’s type parameter is not referenced in the declaration of any of the formal parameters 135
20 FallThrough 45 switch case may fall through 96
Total 280,651 3,402
To address this problem, we selectively pick non-buggy
examples that are similar to the buggy examples, but that do
not suffer from the same programming error k. For example,
if a warning kind k flags binary expressions, we would like
SknBug to be mostly composed of sequences that include binary
expressions but that do not suffer from k. To select such similar
examples in an automated manner, we perform two steps. First,
we convert each sequence into a more compact vector that
summarizes the tokens in the sequence. Second, we query
all non-buggy examples for those similar to a given buggy
example using a nearest neighbor algorithm. The following
explains these two steps in more detail.
The first step converts sequence vectors to frequency vectors.
Let vs = [t1, t2, . . . , tn] be a vector of n tokens corresponding
to code sequence s. We convert vs into a vector of frequencies
vfreq
s
of all words in V . In other words, we compute:
vfreqs = [count(ti1 , s), count(ti2 , s), . . . , count(ti|V | , s)]
for some fixed ordering i1, i2, . . . , i|V | of the vocabulary V ,
and where count(t, s) returns the number of occurrences of
t in s. We exclude the special tokens UNK and PAD when
computing vfreq
s
.
Before searching the space of non-buggy examples using
the token-frequency vectors, we counteract the effect of tokens
with very high frequencies. Examples of these tokens include
new, =, return, and separators, all of which are likely
to appear across many different sequences of source code
but are less relevant for selecting non-buggy examples. To
counteract their influence, we apply term frequency-inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF), which offsets the number of
occurrences of each token in the frequency vectors by the
number of sequences this token appears in. TF-IDF is widely
used in information retrieval and text mining to reflect how
important a word is to a document in a corpus of documents,
while accommodating for the fact that some words occur more
frequently than others.
As the second step, to search the space of non-buggy
code sequences in our data set, we use an efficient, high-
dimensional search technique called approximated nearest
neighbor (ANN). We use ANN to search the vector repre-
sentations of all non-buggy methods for a subset SANN
knBug
of
non-buggy examples that are similar to the multi-dimensional
space of sequence vectors in Skbug .
Definition 2 (ANN Non-Buggy Examples): For every buggy
example skbug ∈ Skbug of bug kind k ∈ K , the ANN of skbug
is ANNsearch(skbug , SknBug ) where ANNsearch(x, Y ) returns
the ANN of x in Y . Therefore, the set of non-buggy nearest
neighbors sequences of Skbug is:
SANN
knBug
=
{
s′ ∈ SknBug | s
′ = ANNsearch(s, SknBug)
∀s ∈ Skbug
} (1)
ANN uses locality sensitive hashing to perform this high-
dimensional space, which is much more efficient than exhaus-
tively computing pair-wise distances between all vectors.
2) Selecting Buggy Examples: When selecting sequences
SknBug of non-buggy examples, we need to consider whether
the location of the bug is within the first n tokens of the
method. A warning w = (k, lw,m) that flags line lw in method
m could fall beyond the sequence sm extracted from m if the
last token of sm, tn = (lex, t, ltn) has ltn < lw. In other
words, it could be that a warning flagged at some method by
the oracle occurs at a line beyond the extracted sequence of
that method because we limit the sequence length to n tokens.
In such a case, we remove this example from the set of buggy
examples of bug kind k and we use it as a non-buggy example.
D. Learning Bug Detection Models
The remaining step in our neural bug finding approach is
training the ML model. Based on the vector representation
of buggy and non-buggy examples of code sequences, we
formulate the bug finding problem as binary classification.
Definition 3 (Bug Finding Problem): Given a previously
unseen piece of code C, the problem Pk : C → [0, 1] is to
predict the probability that C suffers from bug kind k, where
0 means certainly not buggy and 1 means that C certainly has
a bug of kind k.
We train a model to find a bug of kind k in a supervised
setup based on two types of training examples: buggy exam-
ples (vbug, 1) and non-buggy examples (vnBug, 0), where vbug
and vnBug are the vector representations of buggy and non-
buggy code, respectively. During prediction, we interpret a
predicted probability lower than 0.5 as “not buggy”, and as
“buggy” otherwise.
Since we model source code as a sequence of tokens,
we employ recurrent neural networks (RNNs) as models. In
particular, we use bi-directional RNN with Long Short Term
Memory (LSTM) [34] units. As the first layer, we have an
embedding layer that reduces the one-hot encoding of tokens
into a smaller embedding vector of length 50. For the RNN,
we use one hidden bi-directional LSTM layer of size 50. We
apply a dropout of 0.2 to the hidden layer to avoid overfitting.
The final hidden states of the RNN are fed through a fully
connected layer to an output layer of dimension 1, using the
sigmoid activation function. For the loss function, we choose
binary cross entropy, and we train the RNN using the Adam
optimizer. Finally, we use a dynamically calculated batch size
based on the size of the training data (10% of the size of the
training set with a maximum of 300).
E. Different Evaluation Settings
We study four different ways of combining training and
validation data, summarized in Table II. These four ways are
combinations of two variants of selecting code examples. On
the one hand, we consider balanced data, i.e., with an equal
number of buggy and non-buggy examples. On the other hand,
we consider a stratified split, which maintains a distribution
of buggy and non-buggy examples similar to that in all the
collected data, allowing us to mimic the frequency of bugs
in the real-world. For instance, assume the total number of
samples collected for a specific warning kind is 200 samples,
of which 50 (25%) are buggy and 150 (75%) are not buggy.
If we train the model with 80% of the data and validate on
the remaining 20%, then a stratified split means the training
set has 160 samples, of which 40 (25%) are buggy and 120
(75%) are not buggy, and the validation set has 40 samples,
of which 10 (25%) are buggy and 30 (75%) are not buggy.
Evaluation setups BS and BANNS correspond to the sce-
nario of using balanced data for training and stratified split
for validation. In setup BS, we randomly sample the non-
buggy examples to build a balanced training set, while in
setup BANNS we use our novel approximated nearest neighbor
(ANN) search for non-buggy examples (Section II-C). Since
for many of the kinds of warnings the number of collected
buggy examples is relatively small for a deep learning task,
we additionally evaluate a third setup, SS, where we utilize
TABLE II
SETUPS USED TO EVALUATE THE NEURAL BUG FINDING MODELS.
Experiment Training Validation
BS Balanced Stratified
BANNS Balanced (ANN sampling) Stratified
SS Stratified Stratified
BB Balanced Balanced
all non-buggy data available by doing a stratified split for
training and validation. Finally, setup BB represents the most
traditional setup for binary classifiers, which uses balanced
training and balanced validation sets.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
We use the JavaParser3 to parse and tokenize all Java
methods in the Qualitas corpus. Tokenized methods, warnings
generated by Error Prone, their kinds, and locations are stored
in JSON files for processing by the models. Python scikit-
learn4 is used to compute the TD-IDF of all examples and
NearPy5 is used to find the ANN of each buggy example. To
implement the recurrent neural networks, we build upon Keras
and Tensorflow6.
IV. RESULTS
We study the potential of neural bug finding by posing the
following research questions:
• RQ1: How effective are neural models at identifying
common kinds of programming errors?
• RQ2: Why does neural bug finding sometimes work?
• RQ3: Why does neural bug finding sometimes not work?
• RQ4: How does the composition of the training data
influence the effectiveness of a neural model?
• RQ5: How does the amount of training data influence the
effectiveness of a neural model?
• RQ6: What pitfalls exist when evaluating neural bug
finding?
A. Experimental Setup
For each experiment, we split all available data into 80%
training data and 20% validation data, and we report the results
with the validation set. Each experiment is repeated five times,
and we report the average results. For the qualitative parts
of our study, we systematically inspected at least ten, often
many more, validation samples from each warning kind. All
experiments are performed on a machine with 48 Intel Xeon
E5-2650 CPU cores, 64GB of memory, and an NVIDIA Tesla
P100 GPU.
3http://javaparser.org/
4https://scikit-learn.org/
5http://pixelogik.github.io/NearPy/
6https://keras.io/ and https://www.tensorflow.org/
TABLE III
PRECISION, RECALL, AND F1 OF THE NEURAL BUG FINDING MODELS OF THE TOP 20 WARNINGS REPORTED BY ERROR PRONE. RESULTS ARE OBTAINED
BY TRAINING WITH 80% OF AVAILABLE DATA AND VALIDATING ON THE REMAINING 20%. TABLE ALSO SHOWS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF EXAMPLES
AVAILABLE IN THE DATA SET. WARNINGS ARE IN DESCENDING ORDER BY THEIR TOTAL NUMBER OF BUGGY EXAMPLES.
Experiment BS Experiment BANNS Experiment SS Experiment BB
Nb. of examples Pr. Re. F1 Pr. Re. F1 Pr. Re. F1 Pr. Re. F1
Id Warning Buggy nBuggy % % % % % % % % % % % %
1 MissingOverride G 268,304 501,937 69.74 86.05 76.97 73.53 77.70 75.48 79.78 74.97 77.28 82.34 84.25 83.24
2 BoxedPrimitiveConstructor L 3,769 767,112 12.00 96.47 21.23 17.47 93.93 29.20 93.62 92.02 92.67 95.51 94.26 94.85
3 Sync.OnNonFinalField G 2,282 653,856 20.19 98.73 33.18 24.14 97.76 38.57 71.05 79.43 74.88 96.28 99.74 97.97
4 ReferenceEquality G 1,680 746,285 1.48 89.17 2.90 1.55 83.21 3.05 78.94 39.40 52.08 85.01 90.40 87.51
5 DefaultCharset G 1,550 747,192 2.18 95.35 4.27 4.06 80.00 7.69 75.61 60.58 66.57 91.83 94.56 93.13
6 EqualsHashCode G 590 673,446 8.20 99.49 14.91 8.79 85.25 15.89 39.71 5.93 10.06 98.38 100.00 99.17
7 Unsync.OverridesSync. G 517 657,303 0.36 82.14 0.72 0.28 68.93 0.55 61.26 16.89 25.27 85.74 77.05 80.73
8 ClassNewInstance G 486 742,585 0.80 94.23 1.59 2.56 85.36 4.97 88.04 79.59 83.46 91.41 93.97 92.44
9 OperatorPrecedence L 362 716,691 0.51 92.22 1.02 0.49 75.56 0.98 70.10 20.28 30.00 89.91 88.67 89.17
10 DoubleCheckedLocking G 204 297,959 2.80 97.56 5.40 5.05 95.61 9.24 95.80 83.41 88.84 98.30 95.53 96.77
11 NonOverridingEquals L 165 488,094 2.04 93.33 3.94 2.97 77.58 5.61 90.01 87.88 88.63 95.22 97.95 96.49
12 NarrowingCompoundAssign. L 158 660,390 0.29 88.12 0.58 0.34 79.38 0.68 53.04 31.25 38.11 92.72 92.22 92.45
13 ShortCircuitBoolean L 116 616,037 0.09 82.61 0.18 0.10 73.91 0.20 72.22 31.30 39.70 78.21 91.82 83.78
14 IntLongMath L 111 531,502 0.23 79.09 0.47 0.30 81.82 0.59 59.52 7.27 12.60 90.82 100.00 94.95
15 NonAtomicVolatileUpdate G 80 369,501 0.07 71.25 0.15 0.04 71.25 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.24 83.60 81.00
16 WaitNotInLoop G 77 469,210 0.27 97.33 0.53 0.30 86.67 0.59 83.17 49.33 61.52 89.75 100.00 94.57
17 ArrayToString L 56 554,213 0.07 96.36 0.13 0.04 61.82 0.08 20.00 1.82 3.33 96.36 96.67 96.18
18 MissingCasesInEnumSwitch G 53 430,701 0.10 85.45 0.20 0.05 43.64 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 81.97 94.64 87.09
19 TypeParam.UnusedInFormals L 46 321,451 0.41 86.67 0.81 0.69 93.33 1.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.70 93.33 92.50
20 FallThrough L 45 615,140 0.08 93.33 0.15 0.43 82.22 0.84 63.33 20.00 30.09 83.44 92.29 87.13
Median 0.46 92.78 0.92 0.59 80.91 1.17 70.58 31.28 38.91 91.12 94.12 92.48
B. RQ1: How effective are neural models at identifying com-
mon kinds of programming errors?
To study the effectiveness of the neural bug finding models,
we measure their precision, recall, and F1-score. For a specific
bug kind, precision is the percentage of actual bugs among
all methods that the model flags as buggy, and recall is the
percentage of bugs detected by the model among all actual
bugs. The F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision and
recall.
We first look at Experiment BANNS, which uses balanced
training data selected using ANN and an imbalanced validation
set. The results of this and the other experiments are shown
in Table III. Across the 20 kinds of warnings we study,
precision ranges between 73.5% down to 0.04%, while recall
ranges between 97.76% and 43.6%. The relatively high recall
shows that neural bug finders find a surprisingly high fraction
of all bugs. However, as indicated by the low precision for
many warnings kinds, many of the models tend to report many
spurious warnings.
In Experiment SS, we use a much larger, but imbalanced,
training set. Table III also shows the results of this experi-
ment. One can observe a clear improvement of precision over
Experiment BANNS for many of the models. This improvement
in precision is due to the richer and larger training set, which
trains the model with many more non-buggy examples than Ex-
periment BANNS, making it more robust against false positives.
However, the increased precision comes at the cost of decreas-
ing recall compared to Experiment BANNS. For example, the
neural model that predicts double checked locking bugs (Id 10
in Table III) has its recall dropping from 95.6% to 83.4% when
using the full training data available. Yet, the reduced recall
is offset by a huge increase in precision, causing the median
F1-score to grow from 1.17% in Experiment BANNS to 38.91%
in Experiment SS.
The effectiveness of neural bug finders varies heavily
across bug patterns, reaching a precision of up to 95.8%
and a recall of up to 97.76% for some patterns, while
dropping down to almost 0% for others.
C. RQ2: Why does neural bug finding work?
To answer this question and also RQ3, we systematically
inspect true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false
negatives for each model. We discuss our observations by
splitting the warning kinds into two groups, based on whether
the information provided to the neural model is, in principle,
sufficient to accurately detect the kind of bug.
1) Bug Kinds with Sufficient Available Information: The
first group includes all bug kinds where the bug pattern could,
in principle, be precisely and soundly detected based on the
information we provide to the neural model. Recall that we
feed the first 50 tokens of a method into the model, and
no other information, such as the class hierarchy or other
methods in the program. In other words, the model is given
enough information to reason about local bugs, which involve
a property of one or a few statements, one or a few expressions,
or the method signature. We mark all warning kinds in this
group with a L (for local) in Table III. Intuitively, these
warning kinds correspond to what traditional lint-like tools
may detect based on a local static analysis.
We now discuss examples of true positives, i.e., correctly
identified bugs, among the warnings reported by models
trained for warning kinds in the first group.
a) Boxed primitive constructor (Id 2): This bug pattern
includes any use of constructors of primitive wrappers, such
as new Integer(1) and new Boolean(false). The
neural bug finder for this warning achieves high precision
and recall of 93.6% and 92% respectively (Table III, Experi-
ment SS). The following is an instance of this bug, which is
detected by the neural model:
1 public int compareTo(java.lang.Object o) {
2 return new Integer(myX).compareTo(new
Integer(((NodeDisplayInfo)o).myX));
3 }
Inspecting these and other bug kinds shows that, in essence, the
model learns to identify specific subsequences of tokens, such
as ". . . new Boolean . . . " and ". . . new Integer . . . ", as
a strong signal for a bug.
b) Operator precedence (Id 9): This warning is about
binary expressions that either involve ungrouped conditionals,
such as x || y && z, or a combination of bit operators and
arithmetic operators, such as x + y << 2. Such expressions
are confusing to many developers and should be avoided or
made more clear by adding parentheses. The following is a
true positive detected by our neural model.
1 @Override
2 public int nextPosition() {
3 assert (positions != null &&
4 nextPos < positions.length)
5 || startOffsets != null
6 && nextPos < startOffsets.length;
7 ...
8 }
Overall, the neural model achieves 70% precision and 20.28%
recall. The fact that the model is relatively successful shows
that neural bug finders can learn to spot non-trivial syntactic
patterns. Note that the space of buggy code examples for this
warning kind is large, because developers may combine an
arbitrary number of binary operators and operands in a single
statement. Given that the model is trained on very few buggy
examples, 290 (80% of 362), the achieved precision and recall
are promising.
The models learn syntactic patterns commonly corre-
lated with particular kinds of bugs and identify specific
tokens and token sequences, such as calls to particular
APIs.
2) Bug Kinds with Only Partial Information: The second
group of bug kinds contains bug patterns that, in principle,
require more information than available in the token sequences
we give to the neural models to be detected soundly and
precisely. For example, detecting these kinds of bugs requires
information about the class hierarchy or whether a field used
in a method is final. We mark these bug kinds with a G
(for global) in Table III. The bug kinds include bugs that
require type and inheritance information, e.g., missing override
annotations (Id 1), missing cases in enum switch (Id 18),
default Charset (Id 5), and un-synchronized method overriding
a synchronized method (Id 7). They also include bugs for
which some important information is available only outside
the current method, such as synchronized on non-final field
(Id 3) and equals-hashcode (Id 6). Note that although detecting
these bugs requires information beyond the sequence of tokens
extracted from the methods, the bug location lies within the
sequence of tokens. Somewhat surprisingly, neural bug finding
also works for some of these bug patterns, achieving precision
and recall above 70% in some cases, which we describe in the
following.
a) Missing @Override (Id 1): This warning is for
methods that override a method of an ancestor class but that
do not annotate the overriding methods with @Override.
Although the supertype information that is required to accu-
rately detect this problem is not available to the neural model,
the model provides high precision and recall. Inspecting
true positives and training examples reveals that the model
learns that many overriding methods override methods of
common Java interfaces and base classes. Examples include
the toString() method from the Object base class and
the run() method from the Runnable interface. In fact,
both method names appear in the data set as buggy 44,789
and 21,767 times, respectively. In other words, the models
successfully learns to identify common instances of the bug
pattern, without fully learning the underlying bug pattern.
b) Default Charset (Id 5): This warning flags specific
API usages that rely on the default Charset of the Java VM,
which is discouraged for lack of portability. The “pattern”
to learn here are specific API names, which implicitly use
the default Charset. The following instance is a true positive
detected by the neural model:
1 private void saveTraining() {
2 BufferedWriter writer = null;
3 try {
4 writer = new BufferedWriter(new
FileWriter(SAVE_TRAINING));
5 ...
As we show in RQ3, this bug is more subtle than it looks.
Correctly detecting this problem requires, in some cases,
information on the type of receiver objects, on which the APIs
are called.
c) Double checked locking (Id 10): This bug is about
a lazy initialization pattern [35] where an object is checked
twice for nullness with synchronization in-between the null
checks, to prevent other threads from initializing the object
concurrently. The following is a true positive reported by our
neural model.7
1 private SimpleName pointcutName = null;
2 ...
3 public SimpleName getName() {
4 if (this.pointcutName == null) {
5 synchronized (this) {
6 if (this.pointcutName == null) {
7 ...
8 return this.pointcutName;
9 }
7Note that our approach extracts the token sequence from the method
body, i.e., starting from line 3. The object declaration at line 1 is shown
for completeness only.
While the method with the bug contains parts of the ev-
idence for the bug, it is missing the fact that the field
pointcutName is not declared as volatile. So how
does the model for this bug pattern achieve the surprisingly
high precision and recall of 95.8% and 83.41%, respectively
(Experiment SS)? We find that the correct pattern of double
checked locking almost never occurs in the data set. Even
the ANN search for non-buggy examples yields sequences
that are indeed similar, e.g., sequences that have a null check
followed by a synchronized block, but that do not exactly
match the lazy initialization pattern. Given the data set, the
model learns that a null check, followed by a synchronized
block, followed by a another null check is likely to be buggy.
In practice, this reasoning seems mostly accurate, because the
idiom of double checked locking is hard to get right even for
experienced programmers [36].
Neural bug finding sometimes works even when only
parts of the information to accurately detect a specific
kind of bug is given. The reason is that models learn to
identify common instances of the general bug pattern or
simply ignore unlikely side conditions.
D. RQ3: Why does neural bug finding sometimes not work?
To answer this question, we systematically inspect false
positives and false negatives for each model. We present one
example for each case and provide insights why the models
mis-classify them.
1) Spurious Warnings: Spurious warnings, i.e. false posi-
tives, occur when a model predicts a non-existing bug.
a) Default Charset (Id 5): In RQ2, we showed that
finding this bug pattern entails learning specific API names,
e.g., FileWriter. Another common API that raises this
warning is String.getBytes(), which also relies on the
platform default Charset. Because this API is strongly present
in the training examples, the model learns that sequences that
have the getBytes token are likely to be buggy. However,
whether an occurence of this token is erroneous depends on the
receiver object on which the method is called. The following
is a false positive for this bug kind, where a method with the
same name is declared for a user defined type.
1 public class UnwovenClassFile implements
IUnwovenClassFile {
2 ...
3 public byte[] getBytes() {
4 return bytes;
5 }
6 ...
2) Missed Bugs: The neural models inevitably have false
negatives, i.e., they fail to detect some instances of the bug
patterns.
a) Non-overriding equals (Id 11): This bug pattern
flags methods which look like Object.equals, but are
in fact different. A method overriding Object.equals
must have the parameter passed to it strictly of type
Object, a requirement for proper overload resolution.
Therefore, any method that looks like boolean
equals(NotObjectType foo) {...} should be
flagged buggy. The following, is an instance of a false
negative for this warning kind.
1 boolean equals(NodeAVL n) {
2 if (n instanceof NodeAVLDisk) {
3 return this == n ||
4 (getPos() == ((NodeAVLDisk) n).getPos());
5 }
6 return false;
7 }
The reason why the model misses this bug is that it fails to
distinguish between “boolean equals(Object” and any
other sequence “boolean equals(NotObjectType”.
We believe that this failure is not an inherent limitation of
the neural model, but can rather be attributed to the scarcity
of our training data. In total, we have 165 examples of this
bug in our data set, and for training the model, we use 80%
of the data, i.e., around 132 examples. Given this amount of
data, the recall for this bug reaches 87.88% (Experiment SS).
E. RQ4: How does the composition of the training data
influence the effectiveness of a neural model?
To answer this question, we compare the results from
Experiments BS, BANNS, and SS. Comparing Experiments BS
and BANNS in Table III shows that using ANN to select non-
buggy samples for training increases the precision of the
trained models in most of the cases. The reason is that having
similar code examples, some of which are labeled as buggy
while others are labeled non-buggy, helps the model to define
a more accurate border between the two classes. Recent work
on selecting inputs for testing neural networks is based on a
similar observation [37]. At the same time, using ANN also
causes a drop in recall, mainly because the model faces a
more difficult learning task. For example, using ANN to train
the model for bug pattern 2 improves precision by 5.5% but
degrades recall by 2.5%.
Comparing Experiments BANNS and SS shows that adding
more non-buggy examples to the training set decreases the
recall by a value between 2% (bug pattern 2) up to a complete
erasure of the recall (bug pattern 19). On the positive side, the
additional data added in Experiment SS significantly improves
the precision of all models. For example, the model of bug
pattern 16 improves precision by 83%.
The composition of the training data has a huge impact.
Balanced training data (Experiments BS and BANNS)
favors recall over precision, while adding more non-
buggy training data (Experiment SS) favors precision.
F. RQ5: How does the amount of training data influence the
effectiveness of a neural model?
Figure 2 addresses this question by plotting precision and
recall of the different models over the number of buggy
examples that a model is trained on. All four plots show a
generally increasing effectiveness, both in terms of precision
and recall, for warning kinds, where more data is available.
For example, the models for bug patterns 2 and 3 reach high
precision and recall in both experiments BANNS and SS due
to the availability of more examples. Perhaps surprisingly,
though, some models are effective even with much a smaller
number of warnings. For example, for bug patterns 11 and 16,
the neural models achieve precision and recall above 77%,
even though only 165 and 77 buggy examples are available,
respectively.
More training data improves the effectiveness of a
learned model, but surprisingly small data sets, e.g., of
only 77 buggy examples, can yield effective models.
G. RQ6: What pitfalls exist when evaluating neural bug find-
ing?
In binary classification problems, the usual setup for training
and validation is to use balanced data sets. However, bugs
of a specific kind are rare in real-world code. Therefore,
evaluating neural bug finding8 using a balanced data setup
yields misleading results, as described in the following.
Table III shows the results of Experiment BB, which uses
balanced data for both training and validation. The first
glimpse at the results is very encouraging, as they show that
neural bug finding works pretty well. Unfortunately, these
numbers are misleading. The reason for the spuriously good
results is that the neural models overfit to the presence, or
absence, of particular tokens, which may not necessarily be
strong indicators of a bug.
As an example, consider bug pattern 6 , which flags classes
that override the Object.equals method but that fail
to also override Object.hashCode. In Table III, Experi-
ment BB, the neural model predicting this warning is almost
perfect with 100% recall and 98.38% precision. However, a
closer look into this model and manual inspection of the train-
ing and validation examples reveal that the neural model has
simply learned to predict that the sequence of tokens "public
boolean equals (Object . . . " is always buggy. This
explains why the model achieves a recall of 100%. But
why is precision also quite high at 98%? It turns out that
randomly sampling 590 non-buggy examples (corresponding
to the number of buggy examples) from 673,446 non-buggy
methods is likely to yield mostly methods that do not contain
the sequence "public boolean equal . . . ". In other
words, the unrealistic setup of training and validation data
misleads the model into an over-simplified task, and hence
the spuriously good results.
Comparing the results from Experiments BS and BB further
reveals the fragility of Experiment BB’s setup. In Experi-
ment BS, the training set is constructed as in Experiment BB,
but the validation set contains a lot more samples, most of
them are actually not buggy. Because the models learned in
Experiment BB do not learn to handle non-buggy examples
similar to the buggy examples, their precision is low. That
is why for the same warning kind, e.g. Id 6, the precision
in Experiment BS is only 8% instead of the 98.38% in
Experiment BB.
8and any bug finding technique
Even though bug detection can be seen as binary classi-
fication tasks, evaluating its effectiveness with balanced
validation data can be highly misleading.
H. Data Availability
All data required to inspect and reproduce our results will
be made publicly available with the final version of the paper.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Lessons Learned
The overall question of this paper is whether neural bug
finding is feasible. Given our results, we give a positive yet
cautious answer. We see empirically that neural models can
learn syntactic code patterns, and hence these models are
indeed capable of finding local bugs that do not require inter-
procedural or type-based reasoning. Moreover, even for the
more difficult bugs, which require information beyond the
sequence of tokens extracted from methods, e.g. type and
inter-procedural information, simple sequence-based learning
surprisingly detects a non-negligible percentage of the bugs.
To make neural bug finding applicable to wider range
of bugs, our work reveals the need for richer ML models
that utilize information beyond the source code tokens, e.g.,
type hierarchy, API-specific knowledge, and inter-procedural
analysis. How to effectively feed such information into neural
models is closely related to the ongoing challenge of finding
suitable source code representations for machine learning.
Finally, our results emphasize another long-standing chal-
lenge in machine learning: data is important. Our results
demonstrate that both the amount of training data as well as
how to sample the training data has a huge influence on the
effectiveness of the learned bug finding models. Collecting
data for neural bug finding remains an open problem, which
seems worthwhile addressing in future work.
B. Threats to Validity
Our training and validation subjects might bias the results
towards these specific projects, and the findings may not
generalize beyond them. We try to mitigate this problem by
using the Qualitas corpus, which consists of a diverse set of
112 real-world projects.
We use warnings reported by a static analyzer as a proxy
for bugs. The fact that some of these warnings may be
false positives and that some actual bugs may be missed,
creates some degree of noise in our ground truth. By building
upon an industrially used static analyzer tuned to have less
than 10% false positives [18], we try to keep this noise
within reasonable bounds. Future research on collecting and
generating buggy and non-buggy code examples will further
mitigate this problem.
Finally, the qualitative analysis of the validation results is
subject to human error. To mitigate this, two of the authors
discussed and validated all the findings.
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(d) Experiment SS recall
Fig. 2. Effect of number of buggy examples on precision and recall for each warning kind. The plots use the ids from Table III. Bug Id 1 is not shown due
to the huge difference in x-axis scale.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Static Bug Finding
Techniques for scanning source code for particular bug pat-
terns go back to the pioneering lint tool [38]. More recent tools
deployed in industry include Error Prone [2], which is used
at Google and serves as an oracle for our study, and Infer [3],
which is used at Facebook. Detailed accounts of deploying
static bug detectors consider a name-based static checker [39],
applying the FindBugs tool [40], [41], and a rule inference-
based static bug detector [42]. Research on static bug finding
includes work on finding API misuses [43]–[45], name-based
bug detection [46], security bugs [47], finding violations of
inferred programmer beliefs [48], and other kinds of anomaly
detection [49]. These approaches involve significant manual
effort for creating and tuning the bug detectors, whereas we
here study bug detectors learned from examples only.
The presence of false positives, a problem shared by both
traditional and learned bug detectors, motivates work on
prioritizing analysis warnings, e.g., based on the frequency
of true and false positives [50], the version history of a
program [51], and statistical models based on features of
warnings and code [52]. These efforts are orthogonal to the bug
detection problem addressed in this paper, and could possibly
be combined with neural bug detectors.
B. Machine Learning and Language Modeling for Bug Find-
ing
Learned models are becoming increasingly popular for bug
finding. DeepBugs exploits identifier names, e.g., of variables
and methods, to find buggy code [14]. Vasic et al. [53] use
pointer networks to jointly find and fix variable mis-use bugs.
Choi et al. train a memory network [54] to predict whether a
piece of code may cause a buffer overrun [15]. A broader set of
coding mistakes that may cause vulnerabilities is considered in
other learning-based work [16]. Harer et at. [17] train a CNN
to classify methods as vulnerable or not based on heuristics
built on labels from a static analyzer. The main contribution
of our work is to systematically study general neural bug
detection and to predict the bug kind.
Instead of classifying whether a piece of code suffers
from a bug, anomaly detection approaches search for code
that stands out and therefore may be buggy. Bugram uses
a statistical language model that warns about uncommon n-
grams of tokens [25]. Salento learns a probabilistic model of
API usages and warns about unusual usages [55]. In contrast
to our work, these techniques learn from non-buggy examples
only. Ray et al. [56] explains why this is possible and shows
that buggy code is less natural than non-buggy code.
Orthogonal to bug detection is the problem of defect predic-
tion [57], [58]. Instead of pinpointing specific kinds of errors,
as our work, it predicts whether a given software component
will suffer from any bug at all. Wang et al. [6] propose a neural
network-based model for this task [6].
C. Machine Learning on Programs
Beyond bug detection, machine learning has been applied
to other programming-related tasks [5], such as predicting
identifier names [8], [10] and types [8], [9], [59]. A challenge
for any learning-based program analysis is how to represent
code. Work on this problem includes graph-based representa-
tions [29], [30], embeddings learned from sequences of API
calls [28], embeddings learned from paths through ASTs [31],
[32], and embeddings for edits of code [7]. Future work should
study the impact of these representations on neural bug finding.
D. Studies of Bug Finding Techniques
A study related to ours applies different learning techniques
to the bug detection problem [60]. Their data set includes
seeded bugs, whereas we use real bugs. Another difference
is that most of their study uses manually extracted features
of code, whereas we learn models fully automatically, without
any feature engineering. Their preliminary results with neural
networks are based on a bit-wise representation of source code,
which they find to be much less effective than we show token
sequence-based models to be.
More traditional bug finding techniques have been subject
to other studies, some of which focus on the recall of bug
detectors [4], [61], while others focus on their precision [62],
[63]. The effectiveness of test generation techniques has been
studied as well [64], [65]. Our work complements those studies
by systematically studying neural bug finding.
E. Defect Prediction and Unbalanced Data
Machine learning models for software defect prediction [66]
suffer from data imbalance [67] (IV-G). Skewed training data
is usually tackled either by sampling techniques [68], cost-
sensitive learning [69], or ensemble learning [70]. Under-,
over-, or synthetic-sampling techniques [68], [71] have been
applied to alleviate data imbalance in software defect pre-
diction. Our approximated nearest neighbor (ANN) sampling
of non-buggy examples (II-C1) is a form of guided under-
sampling.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the opportunities and challenges of a
novel way of creating bug detectors via deep learning. We
present neural bug finding and systematically study its effec-
tiveness based on warnings obtained from a traditional static
bug detection tool. Studying neural bug detection models for
20 common kinds of programming errors shows that (i) neural
bug finding can be highly effective for some bug patterns but
fails to work well for other bug patterns, (ii) learned models
pick up common code patterns associated with buggy code, as
well as common instances of more general bug patterns, and
(iii) surprisingly small data sets can yield effective models.
Our work also identifies some pitfalls associated with training
and validating neural bug detectors and presents ways to
avoid them. We believe that this work is an important step
into a promising new direction, motivating future work on
more advanced neural bug finding tools and on improving the
process of obtaining training data.
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